Editorial

My answer was—and remains—yes.

I reminded viewers of the Italian blackout of 2003, when a tree fell onto a 400 kV power line in Switzerland causing it to trip—what a banal reason for such a massive disruption, affecting over 55 million people for hours. I remember it well. I was involved in the post-event mitigation measures, specifically developing a novel suspension arrangement for the conductors on that very line to improve clearances and prevent future flashovers.

Events like these are reminders that in our interconnected grid, large disturbances are not only possible—they are inevitable. The question is not whether a blackout will occur again, but how we can reduce its likelihood, limit its spread, and—most critically—accelerate the restoration process.

That is precisely why, during our biennial CIGRE Session in Paris, we host a dedicated workshop on “Large Disturbances.” This session has become a cornerstone of our knowledge-sharing mission. It brings together system operators, utility experts, manufacturers, and researchers from around the globe to examine major grid disruptions, including root causes, operational shortcomings, and successful restoration techniques. The focus is on practical, real-world insights—lessons forged in crisis and essential for building resilience into our future systems.

Staying true to that mission, we responded swiftly and proactively to the Iberian event. At our recent CIGRE Symposium in Trondheim, an ad hoc expert panel was convened during the opening ceremony to explore the incident. While the precise cause remains under investigation, we used the opportunity to showcase the remarkable restoration effort and draw comparisons to a similar blackout that affected Brazil in 2023.

A full report from this panel will appear in an upcoming issue of ELECTRA. However, some of the key highlights are worth sharing here. Restoration began by leveraging the France and Morocco AC interconnections to form stable power islands, gradually rebuilding the system in phases. Within 14 hours, all substations in the transmission grid were back in operation. By 7:00 AM the next morning—18 hours after the incident—electricity demand had returned to 99.5% and the system was reconnected with the Balearic Islands, marking a return to full normalcy.

The system performed admirably, thanks to its resilient design and the effectiveness of its maintenance practices. Over 4,000 switchgear operations were executed remotely without a single incident—testament to the reliability of the high-voltage equipment, protection schemes, and control systems. The professionalism and preparedness of the transmission personnel were outstanding: the entire effort was coordinated from the Maintenance and Telecommunication Centers, and not a single safety incident was reported throughout the response!

The telecommunications infrastructure also proved critical to this success. All essential services—SCADA, EMS, voice communication, telecontrol, and protection signal transmission—remained fully operational. This enabled the Dispatch Center to maintain continuous visibility and control, ensuring that strategic decisions could be made with confidence and speed.

In the end, this blackout was not just a test of infrastructure—it was a test of people, processes, and preparation. And the power community, in particular our colleagues in Portugal and Spain, passed that test with distinction.

But we cannot afford complacency. Each disturbance is a call to action: to harden our systems, refine our coordination, and reinforce our international partnerships. As the energy transition accelerates and complexity grows, the lessons we learn from blackouts will be essential in preventing the next one—or at least ensuring it’s shorter and less disruptive.

This is where CIGRE plays a vital role: as a neutral, global platform for technical collaboration, CIGRE brings together experts from all continents to share knowledge, evaluate emerging risks, and develop robust strategies for future resilience. Through our Study Committees, working groups, events, and publications, we ensure that experience becomes expertise—and that no blackout goes unexamined or unlearned.

Let us continue to treat every incident not as a failure of technology, but as an opportunity for knowledge, so that can we truly stay prepared for the blackout.

Konstantin O. Papailiou